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Abstract
Demand-Response (DR) programs, whereby users of an electricity
network are encouraged by economic incentives to re-arrange their con-
sumption in order to reduce production costs, are envisioned to be a
key feature of the smart grid paradigm. Several recent works proposed
DR mechanisms and used analytical models to derive optimal incen-
tives. Most of these works, however, rely on a macroscopic description
of the population that does not model individual choices of users.
In this paper, we conduct a detailed analysis of those models and
we argue that the macroscopic descriptions hide important assump-
tions that can jeopardize the mechanisms’ implementation (such as
the ability to make personalized offers and to perfectly estimate the
demand that is moved from a timeslot to another). Then, we start
from a microscopic description that explicitly models each user’s de-
cision. We introduce four DR mechanisms with various assumptions
on the provider’s capabilities. Contrarily to previous studies, we find
that the optimization problems that result from our mechanisms are
complex and can be solved numerically only through a heuristic. We
present numerical simulations that compare the different mechanisms
and their sensitivity to forecast errors. At a high level, our results
show that the performance of DR mechanisms under reasonable as-
sumptions on the provider’s capabilities are significantly lower than
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those suggested by previous studies, but that the gap reduces when
the population’s flexibility increases.
1 Introduction
Demand Response (DR hereinafter) programs are envisioned to be a key
feature of the Smart Grid paradigm [1]. By means of economic incentives
(discounts or penalties), DR schemes encourage users to rearrange their con-
sumption in response to the network state, thus mitigating the grid overload
and driving wholesale prices down.
Several analytical models are available in the literature, which describe
and quantify the effects of DR mechanisms. Whatever their specifics are,
these schemes need to model how users react to the incentives. Ideally
the models should capture the most realistic features of a practical DR
mechanism while maintaining tractability.
Among these contributions, the authors of [2] study how an energy
provider should select time-dependent discounts to minimize its production
costs. They assume that the percentage of users who shift their consump-
tion from slot i to slot j is a decreasing function of the temporal distance
between slots i and j and a concave and increasing function of the discount
offered in slot j (Rj), independent from discounts in other slots. The same
user’s model as in [2] is adopted also in [3], where the optimization problem
is extended in order to account for battery storages and distributed renew-
able sources available into a specific microgrid. Authors of [4] propose a
day ahead pricing scheme which maximizes the provider’s profitability and
capacity utilization. Users are assumed to reschedule their consumption by
comparing the utility vi they get by scheduling a task in each timeslot i;
therefore they allocate their consumption proportionally to these utilities,
i.e., they consume a fraction vi∑T
j=1 vj
of their total energy demand in timeslot
i. The resulting optimization problem is non convex but some relaxation
techniques are introduced, which allow one to calculate a solution within
a reasonable amount of time. In [5], a more realistic model is proposed
where each user first calculates the welfare (defined as utility minus time-
dependent cost) she gets from consuming electricity in each of the possible
timeslots, and then allocates all the consumption to the slot returning the
largest welfare. As we show below (see Sec. 4.4) this model can lead to
a much more complex optimization problem than the one presented in [5].
Finally, the authors of [6] propose a full-fledged game theoretical model,
but their results hold only if users experience a large number of interactions
without any change in the system.
We claim that these studies rely on too strong assumptions, which jeop-
ardize their usability for practical purposes. Interestingly, we observe that
the assumptions are sometimes hidden in the macroscopic models the pa-
pers start from. In particular in this paper we focus on [2] and show that its
model requires personalized offers and a very precise forecast of the base-
line consumption of each user. The implementation of these features may
require potentially significant costs in terms of communication, measure-
ment and computation infrastructure. Besides highlighting these implicit
requirements in the analytical framework in [2] (and then also in [3]), we ex-
plore their potentials considering four DR mechanisms with different levels
of complexity:
1. the base mechanism corresponds to an optimization problem similar to
the one considered in [2], it requires personalized offers and individual
consumption forecasts; the energy production cost is optimized over
the discount values, each of which is offered to a given fraction of the
population,
2. the optimized mechanism takes full advantage of personalized offers
and consumption forecasts by minimizing the cost over both the dis-
count values and the population fractions to which the discounts are
offered,
3. the robust mechanism relies on personalized offers, but does not need
individual consumption forecasts,
4. finally the broadcast mechanism (analogous to that in [5]) needs neither
of the two features.
Interestingly, contrarily to prior studies, we find that the cost-minimization
problems resulting from our DR mechanisms are not convex (even for the
base mechanism). Nevertheless, simple heuristics can identify (potential)
minima in a reasonable amount of time in realistic scenarios. Then, our
numerical results show that the simpler robust and broadcast mechanisms
achieve significantly lower cost reductions than the optimized mechanism,
which is difficult to implement, but that the gap reduces when the popula-
tion’s flexibility increases.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we discuss how the macro-
scopic models considered in [2, 3, 4] hide some implicit assumptions about
the user rationality or about the interactions between the provider and the
user. We define our microscopic model in Sec. 3 and then describe different
DR mechanisms and their corresponding optimization problems in Sec. 4.
Finally, we evaluate their performance numerically in a realistic scenario in
Sec. 5.
Due to space constraints proofs, examples and some additional numerical
results are in the companion technical report [9].
2 Pitfalls when Starting from Macroscopic Models
In this section, we describe in more detail the macroscopic models proposed
in the literature for day-ahead price optimization. Consider a finite time
horizon discretized in a set T of N timeslots and a large population S of
users. The baseline aggregate energy consumption in slot j is denoted by
E0j .
The energy provider charges a flat rate B, but it can offer discount rates
to incentivize the users to move some of their consumption so as to reduce
the energy production cost. Due to consumption shifts, the actual aggre-
gate consumption in time slot j is E1j . Observe that a usual assumption in
the literature (including the papers mentioned above) is that the introduc-
tion of a DR scheme neither reduces nor increases users’ demand; it merely
rearranges users’ consumption in a more cost effective way, so that
N∑
j=1
E0j =
N∑
j=1
E1j . (1)
We denote the amount of consumption shifted from slot j to slot i 6= j as
Ej→i, and the amount of consumption the users refuse to shift away from j
as Ej→j . Then we have
E1i = E
0
i +
N∑
z=1
Ez→i −
N∑
k=1
Ei→k.
We now start to further detail the model considering some specific as-
sumptions made in previous works. In [2] and [3], the electricity provider
offers an energy price discount Ri ≥ 0 in each slot i. The users are assumed
to react to these incentives by shifting a fraction of their baseline consump-
tion from slot j to slot i (|j − i| slots away) according to the following
formula:
Ej→i = E0jSj(Ri, |j − i|). (2)
Sj(Ri, |j− i|) is called the aggregate sensitivity function and is increasing in
the discount Ri and decreasing in the temporal shift |j− i|, in order to take
into account the user discomfort.
The provider selects the vector of discounts R in order to minimize its
total cost, equal to the sum of the electricity generation costs and the loss
of revenues due to the discounts. In particular the optimization problem
considered in [2] is the following:
min
R
∑
i
∑
j 6=iRiEj→i +
∑
i ci
(
E1i
)
(3)
s.t. 0 ≤ Ri ≤ B ∀i = 1, . . . N, (4)
where ci(·) is the cost of electricity production in slot i. Eq. (4) guarantees
that discounts R are non negative and smaller than the flat rate B, so that
the money stream goes toward the provider.
As it often happens, the devil is hidden in the details, and in this case
in Eqs. (2) and (3). Our first remark is that the cost of lost revenues∑
i
∑
j 6=iRiEj→i in Eq. (3) implicitly assumes the possibility to reward only
the consumption actually shifted from j to i, i.e., Ej→i, but this quantity
cannot be directly measured. The actual consumption E1i can be measured,
and then Ej→i can be quantified provided that we have good estimates of the
sensitivity function Sj(Ri, |j − i|) and of the baseline consumption E0i . Let
us assume for a moment that Sj(Ri, |j−i|) is known from historical data and
that the aggregate baseline consumption may be predicted with a reason-
ably high level of accuracy on a large set of users. Then it seems possible to
solve the macroscopic problem in Eqs. (3) and (4), but we need to consider
also what should happen at the microscopic scale. While the estimates for
the aggregate baseline consumption can be adequately precise, finally the
billing is done at the user’s granularity and each user expects to receive the
price discount corresponding to the energy consumption she actually moved.
If the energy bill’s reduction does not correspond to her forecast, the user is
likely to opt out of the program (in particular if she has experienced under-
payments) or to reduce her efforts and milk occasional discounts. It appears
then that Eq. (3) implicitly requires very precise predictions of individual
consumptions.
We now observe that the form of the sensitivity function Sj(Ri, |j − i|)
in Eq. (2) indicates that the amount of energy shifted from j to i depends
on the discount Ri but not on the other discounts. We can then ask our-
selves which individual decisions may lead to this aggregate behavior, an
issue ignored both in [2] and [3]. As long as a rational individual is offered
two different discounts Ri and Rk, it seems natural that her decision to
move some consumption from j to i or from j to k or to keep it in j will
take into account both the discounts. To stress the point, consider a case
when both Sj(Ri, |j − i|) and Sj(Rk, |j − k|) are positive, but moving the
consumption from i to k is both less inconvenient (i.e., |j− k| < |j− i|) and
more rewarding (i.e., Rk > Ri). There is then no reason why the user would
move consumption to i. The conclusion is the same for all the users and
then we should have Ej→i = 0 at the aggregate level, in contradiction with
Eq. (2). We can then conclude that the expression of the sensitivity function
in Eq. (2) is not suited to model the situation when a user is offered two or
more rewards, but it can capture the case when the user decides between
moving from j to i in exchange of a discount Ri or staying in j. If every user
is offered a single discount to move to a given slot, but different users can
receive different offers, then Eq. (2) can reasonably describe the macroscopic
effect of such personalized offers. The details are described in Sec. 4.1, here
we only highlight that Eq. (2) requires then that the electricity provider i)
calculates an offer for each user, ii) communicates individually to the user,
iii) considers the individual offer when billing the user. This is clearly more
demanding than simply advertising to the whole population the same set of
discounts.
We observe that the equivalent sensitivity function considered in [4] poses
similar problems. Using our notation, we have Ej→i = vi∑
k∈T vk
E0j , where vi
is the net utility a user gets by consuming electricity in slot i and can be
a function of the timeslot itself and of the discount Ri. This formula tries
to capture the effect of the whole set of discounts, but it is not clear again
what is the underlying user’s model: if slot i has a larger utility than slot k
(vi > vk), why should the user consume in k?
3 Starting from a Microscopic Model
In the previous section we made the point that, while aggregate population
models may be convenient, it is necessary to explicitly consider the micro-
scopic level: how the user takes the decisions and how the provider and the
user are supposed to interact. In this paper we follow the opposite path in
comparison to the existing works mentioned: we move from the microscopic
level to the macroscopic one. In particular, in this section, we start from a
clear model of rationality for the single user and then move to describe how
aggregate quantities can be derived.
Each user u has a baseline energy consumption {e0uj }j=1,...N that leads
to the aggregate baseline consumption E0j =
∑
u∈S e
0u
j for j = 1, . . . N . We
assume in what follows that users are homogeneous, i.e.,
∀ u, e0uj = e0j j = 1, . . . N. (5)
In [9] we show how the DR mechanisms perform when this assumption does
not hold.
User u is characterized by a private type Du = {duj→i}j,i=1,...N where
duj→i indicates the discomfort due to shifting one unit of consumption from
timeslot j to timeslot i. We assume that discomforts are expressed in mon-
etary units; and that, ∀u ∈ S,
duj→j = 0 and d
u
j→i > 0, ∀j, i 6= j, (6)
i.e., there is a strictly positive discomfort if and only if consumption is shifted
from its original timeslot. The provider does not know the private type Du
of each user u: from its point of view, each discomfort duj→i is drawn from
a known, continuous distribution Fj→i on [0, αj,i] (where possibly αj,i =
+∞). Discomforts of distinct users are independent but note that we do not
assume that, for a given user, the discomforts {duj→i}j,i=1,...N are mutually
independent.
3.1 Rational Users
We assume that a user simply chooses the option that maximizes her utility.
In particular let T uj be a set of timeslots the user could move the baseline
consumption e0uj to in exchange for different discounts Ruj = {Ruj→k ≥ 0, k ∈
T uj }. The set pair (T uj ,Ruj ) defines the offer user u receives for timeslot j.
The set of options includes the possibility to keep the consumption in j, i.e.,
j ∈ T uj . A rational user maximizes her utility by scheduling her consumption
e0uj to a timeslot
i∗ ∈ arg max
k∈T uj
{
Ruj→k − duj→k
}
. (7)
We assume that if two or more timeslots are equally palatable, the whole
consumption is shifted to only one of them, picked at random with equal
probability.
3.2 Aggregation
We observe that the quantities duj→k in Eq. (7) are random variables, then
two different users could take different decisions while confronted with the
same offers. The aggregate consumption E1i , for i ∈ T , would then be a
random variable. Here we assume (as it is implicit in the other works) that
we always work with large sets of the population so that the variability can
be neglected by approximating actual random quantities with their expected
values. In particular, if a subset Q containing a fraction q of the population
receives an offer (Tj ,Rj), the corresponding consumption shifted from j to
a time slot i, denoted as EQj→i will be
EQj→i = qE
0
j Prob
(
i ∈ arg max
k∈Tj
{
Ruj→k − duj→k
})
, (8)
if the probability that a user has two or more equally palatable times-
lots is zero. When discomforts are continuous random variables (as we
consider in this paper), this is always the case if each user receives only
one offer (the first three mechanisms introduced below) or if the discom-
forts {duj→i}j,i=1,...N are mutually independent. In Sec. 4.4, we discuss
how Eq. (8) should be modified if this probability is not zero. We denote
Prob
(
i ∈ arg maxk∈Tj
{
Rj→k − duj→k
})
simply as Pj→i(Ruj , Tj).
4 DR mechanisms
Under different assumptions on the provider’s capabilities, we introduce dif-
ferent demand response mechanisms based on the microscopic model above,
which are therefore practically implementable. We introduce and study the
corresponding optimization problems.
We start by the base mechanism that leads to the same aggregate opti-
mization problem considered in [2, 3].
4.1 Base mechanism
This mechanism requires that the energy provider can manage personalized
offers to its customers and moreover that it has perfect knowledge (or very
precise estimates) of the baseline consumption of each user.
The population is segmented into N2 disjoint subsets Qj→i, for j, i ∈ T ,
respectively including a fixed fraction qj→i of the population. Each user in
Qj→i is simply offered to move her baseline consumption in slot j (e0j ) to
slot i in exchange for a price discount Ri.
The total consumption that is shifted from j to i is then
Ej→i = qj→iE0j Prob
(
Ri − duj→i > 0
)
as it can be obtained from Eq. (8), taking into account that in this case
Tj = {j, i} and Rj − duj→j = 0. We observe that the probability appearing
on the right-hand side only depends on the reward Ri and on the random
variable duj→i. If the discomfort is only a function of the temporal distance
|j− i|, then the sensitivity function (the ratio of people who move from j to
i) has the same properties than in [2], in particular:
Sj(Ri, |i− j|) = qj→iPj→i(Ri),
where for Pj→i(·) we have made explicit the only variable it depends from.
As we discussed in Sec. 2, because the provider knows exactly the con-
sumption shifted from each user, it can formulate the optimization prob-
lem (3-4). In [2] it is stated that the problem is convex if i) the productions
costs cj(·) are continuous piecewise linear and increasing and ii) the discom-
fort distributions Fj→i(·) are continuous and concave. We show in [9] that
this is not the case by providing a counterexample. Stronger hypotheses are
required for the problem to be concave, as for example the linearity of the
discomfort functions.
In particular in [2] the numerical evaluation considers
Sj(Ri, |i− j|) = 1∑N
k=1
1
(|k−j|+1)
Ri
B · (|i− j|+ 1) ,
that leads us to consider
qj→i =
1
|i−j|+1∑N
k=0
1
|k−j|+1
, Pj→i(Ri) =
Ri
B
. (9)
This particular expression for Pj→i can be obtained if duj→i is a uniform
random variable with support in [0, B]. The numerical results for the base
mechanism in Sec. 5 are obtained considering the same expression for the
fractions qj→i.
Due to the non-convexity of the optimization problem (3-4) we cannot
use one of the classic algorithms for convex optimization. For the results
shown in section 5 we have adopted instead a multi-start approach: we have
generated random starting points uniformly distributed in the problem do-
main and we have run per each point a descendent algorithm which con-
verged on a local minimum; the optimal offers are therefore those returning
the smallest cost among these minimizers. This approach does not guaran-
tee convergence to the global optimum but its reliability can be improved
by increasing the number of starting points.
4.2 Optimized Mechanism
We have now understood which DR mechanism can lead to the optimization
problem (3), but now that we look at its implementation at the microscopic
level and the need for personalized offers, some specifics of the base mecha-
nism look arbitrary and unjustified. For example, given that discounts are
not broadcast but each user receives an individual offer, why should the
discounts offered to the two disjoint sets of users Qj→i and Qk→i be equal
to the same value Ri? It is clear that the energy provider can further reduce
the cost if it can independently choose Rj→i and Rk→i. Moreover, there
is no reason to think that the size of the sets {Qj→i} should be fixed, the
fractions {qj→i} can also be optimization variables.
We allow the provider to take advantage of these additional degrees
of freedom that—we repeat—do not impose any additional requirement
to the system. We call this new DR mechanism optimized. The load
Ej→i(Rj→i, qj→i) rescheduled from j to i is now Ej→i(Rj→i, qj→i) = qj→iPj→i(Rj→i)E0j
and the cost minimization problem becomes:
min
R,q
costopt.(R,q) =
∑
i
∑
z 6=iRz→iEz→i+
∑
i ci
(
E1i
)
(10)
s.t. 0 ≤ Rz→i ≤ B ∀z, i = 1, . . . N (11)
0 ≤ qz→i ≤ 1, z, i = 1, . . . N (12)∑
i qz→i ≤ 1, ∀z = 1 . . . N. (13)
Eq. (11) guarantees that discounts R are non negative and smaller than the
flat rate B, Eq. (13) is a consequence of the fact that each user receives at
most one offer for its baseline consumption in a given slot.
The optimization problem (10-13) can be solved with the same heuristic
proposed for problem (3-4).
4.3 Robust Mechanism
The optimization problems (3-4) and (10-13) assume that the provider has
perfect knowledge of each user’s baseline consumption, so that it can cor-
rectly identify the consumption shifted and reduce accordingly the energy
bill. This assumption is probably unrealistic. If the provider does not have
such capability, then it can offer the user a discount for all the consumption
in a given timeslot i and not just for the consumption moved to i. The
population is then divided into N subsets Qi, each containing a fraction qi
of the users. All users in Qi receive one and only one offer: they are en-
couraged to shift their consumption from any timeslot in the time horizon
to timeslot i and they get the discount Ri for all the electricity consumed
in i, including the one originally in i.
We call this scheme robust, because it does not rely on estimates of
individual consumption. It is clearly simpler than the previous two, because
the provider needs only to measure the amount of consumption in i for the
users who got the offer and to bill them accordingly.
The load Ej→i(Ri, qi) shifted from j to i is Ej→i(Ri, qi) = qiPj→i(Ri)E0j .
Note that users in Qi have no interest to move their baseline consumption
away from i, then Ei→i = qiE0i . The robust mechanisms leads to the follow-
ing optimization problem:
min
R,q
costrob.(R,q) =
∑
i,z RiEz→i +
∑
i ci
(
E1i
)
(14)
s.t. 0 ≤ Ri ≤ B i = 1, . . . , N (15)
0 ≤ qi ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , N (16)∑N
i=1 qi ≤ 1. (17)
Note that in Eq. (14) the first sum includes also Ei→i because all the final
consumption in i from the users in Qi is paid at a discounted price. The
term does not appear in Eq. (3) and Eq. (10).
The optimization problem (14-17) can be solved with the same heuristic
proposed for problem (3-4).
4.4 Broadcast Mechanism
In the three mechanisms introduced above, the provider makes personalized
offers to users in selected fractions of the population. This may not always
be possible (due to the complexity it introduces for instance in billing) or
desirable (for perceived fairness issues). Our last mechanism, which is the
simplest (in its definition), does not assume personalized offers. The provider
selects a single vector R of discounts for every time slot and broadcasts these
discounts to all users (hence the name broadcast mechanism). Users then
re-arrange their demand and pay the discounted price for their demand in
each slot (hence this mechanism also does not rely on the need to estimate
shifted demand).
As explained in Sec. 3.1, each individual user moves her demand from
slot j to a slot (potentially j itself) that maximizes her net utility (discount
minus discomfort). Recall that if several slots give equal net utility, the user
chooses one of them randomly.
Until now, we have not made any assumption on the possible correla-
tion of a given user’s discomforts. This is because, in the previous three
mechanisms, each user was receiving only one offer.In the broadcast mech-
anism, each user has several offers to compare to decide on his new demand
schedule, we therefore need to describe the discomfort correlations.
Let us consider now the particular case when two slots, say h and k
may appear equally attractive to a user, i.e. Rh − dj→h = Rk − dj→k.
If we assumed that, for each user, the discomforts {dj→i}{i,j=1,··· ,N} were
mutually independent, this event would have probability zero according to
our assumption on Fi→j , and therefore it would not appear at the aggre-
gate level. As a result, the aggregate demand moved from j to i would be
Ej→i(R) = Pj→i(R)E0j , where
Pj→i(R) = Pr
(
Ri − dj→i ≥ max
k 6=i
{Rk − dj→k}
)
. (18)
However, rather than making the above independence assumption, we
prefer to assume that the discomforts have the form dj→i = βj |i − j|tj ,
where tj is a constant independent of the user and βj is a random variable
with concave Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Fj(·). This model
describes a symmetric delay sensitivity of users (users are indifferent between
moving two hours earlier or two hours later) while keeping the flexibility of
users having a different flexibility of demand of different times (since β and
t are indexed by the origin timeslot j); but it also introduces correlations
between the discomforts of a user. As a result, the fraction of demand
shifting from j to i is
Pj→i(R)=
Pr (Ri − dj→i ≥ maxk 6=i {Rk − dj→k})
1 + 1R2j−i=Ri
, (19)
rather than (18). The denominator in (19) accounts for cases when a slot
other than i (which has to be 2j − i) gives equal net utility for all users.
The broadcast mechanism then leads to the following optimization problem:
min
R
costbrd.(R) =
∑
z
∑
iRiEz→i +
∑
i ci
(
E1i
)
(20)
s.t. 0 ≤ Ri ≤ B ∀i = 1, . . . N. (21)
Unfortunately, due to indicator function in Eq. (19), the cost func-
tion (20) of the broadcast mechanism is not continuous, even in very simple
scenarios with continuous production costs [9]. Discontinuity arises also in
the macroscopic model in [5], but it seems to have been ignored.
In practice, we solve problem (20-21) using the same heuristic proposed
for the previous problems, but we work on a continuous and smooth approx-
imation of the cost function.
4.5 Ranking DR mechanisms
In [9] we prove that the optimized mechanism always performs better than
the base and robust mechanisms, but the ranking cannot be extended fur-
ther.
5 Numerical Results
In this section we evaluate the performance of the different DR mechanisms
in the realistic scenario considered in [2] and based on energy data about
the Ontario province in Canada. In particular, the baseline consumption
E0 and the cost functions are estimated from the IESO energy portfolio [8],
consisting of nuclear plans, hydro gas powered stations and renewable and
from typical costs associated to these energy sources. We considered the
flat rate B = 110$/MWh and the timeslot-independent piecewise-linear cost
function c(·) with derivative: c′(E) = $10 for E ≤ C1, c′(E) = $72.46 for
E ∈ (C1 , C2) and c′(E) = $91 for E ≥ C2, where C1 = 16.3 GWh and C2 =
17.9 GWh represent respectively the base to intermediate load capacity and
intermediate to peak load capacity. We assume that discomforts take the
form dj→i = βj |i− j|, where βj is an exponential random variable with cdf
Fj(R;β) = 1−e
β
µ . µ is a parameter representing the population’s flexibility.
The larger it is, the smaller (in a stochastic order sense) the discomfort of
the users to shift their consumption.
In Fig. 1, we report the cost savings of the DR schemes, normalized to
the initial cost, for four different values of the µ parameter: 110 ,
1
6 ,
1
3 , 1. The
dashed line represents the saving which could be achieved if users’ demand
could be rearranged at the provider’s will without providing any discount
(we indicate it as the dictatorial solution). Consistently with the results in
Sec. 4.5, the optimized mechanism returns larger savings than the robust
and the base ones. Interestingly, the robust mechanism performs consis-
tently better than the base one despite the fact that it does not require the
ability to estimate the demand shifted and it therefore “wastes” some dis-
count by giving it to demand that was already scheduled in a given timeslot
in the baseline demand. Moreover, as the population flexibility increases,
the savings gap between the optimized scheme and the robust mechanism
reduces, the latter being effectively close to exploiting all the population’s
flexibility.
Figure 1: Cost savings normalized to the initial cost, for various flexibility
parameters µ.
In Fig. 2, we focus on the case µ = 13 and analyze the components of
the cost for each DR mechanism. Fig. 2 confirms that the optimized scheme
provides the largest savings as it can minimize the production cost while
paying the smallest amount of discounts. We indicate with wasted discounts
the amount of discounts paid to consumption that would in any case have
been scheduled in that timeslot. The base and optimized mechanisms do not
waste any discount, while the robust mechanism and the broadcast scheme
do, as they provide the discount Ri to all the electricity consumed in i,
including the part of E0i that remains in i.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that macroscopic descriptions of DR mecha-
nisms can hide important assumptions that can jeopardize the mechanisms’
implementation. For this reason, our proposal moved from a microscopic
description that explicitly models each user’s decision. We have then in-
troduced four DR mechanisms with various assumptions on the provider’s
capabilities. Interestingly, contrarily to previous studies, we find that the
optimization problems that result from our mechanisms are complex and
can be solved numerically only through a heuristic. Moreover, our results
show that the performance of DR mechanisms under reasonable assumptions
on the provider’s capabilities are significantly lower than those suggested by
previous studies, but that the gap reduces when the population’s flexibility
increases.
Figure 2: Analysis of the components of the cost savings. All the quantities
are normalized to the initial cost.
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